# Aff—Ableism

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#### Activist Mia Mingus recounts her experience with the medical-industrial complex:

One of my earliest memories of consciously claiming my body for myself was deciding not to wear my brace any more. For years I wore a brace on my right leg; I had to get them re-made or re-fitted almost every year as I grew out of them. I had some that went from my foot to my knee and some that went all the way up to my hip. For a long time I did not question my brace. It was just the way things were, like stairs, people staring at me when I walked, or feeling ashamed of my disability. Among many things, my braces were hot (often made of plastic and or fiberglass), and in the Virgin Islands Caribbean weather, they itched, pinched my skin, and gave me painful blisters which I would try to prevent by wearing more socks or padding. Like my parents, I had come to believe that I “needed” to wear my brace. But something began to change as I entered middle school. I began to ask questions: why should I have to wear something so painful everyday that is supposed to “help” me? If they can send a man to the moon, then surely they can make a comfortable and useful brace for my leg? In the beginning I had small acts of resistance: the daily morning fight about putting my brace on or bringing a change of shoes and changing out of it once I was at school--this went on for years. Finally I was “allowed” to not wear my brace some days, and it was not until I was in college that I was able to choose not to wear my brace everyday.

#### Mingus’ experience is not unique—our concepts of normality and aberrance are intrinsically tied to a medical-industrial complex driven by an insatiable desire for profit. Our society seeks to “fix” what does *not need fixing.*

Peace 9 (William Peace, PhD 1992 in anthropology Columbia University, Interested in disability rights and bioethics, “The Medical Industrial Complex: Normalcy Rules!”, 2009)//Miro

I wish I could write that I have the solution to our health care woes. However, no single individual is that smart; not even Peter Singer, the media darling who has an insidinary impact on the health care debate. To me, the problem with our health care system is directly related to the human penchant to fit into the mainstream, to be normal, that is healthy. This thought came to me after reading Stephen Kuusisto's post "What Disability Knows: Part One and Part Two" (see Planet of the Blind). Kuusisto points out that all those with a visible disability can never be perceived as normal. Disability is thus mistakenly married to normativity. Divorce is not possible. I, and many others who study disability, agree. The stigma attached to the calamity known as disability is as unfortunate as it is unnecessary. We humans are a diverse bunch and this diversity is the essence of our strength. Yet we fear difference and particularly disability. In disability I see only potential, adaptation, and the best that humanity has to offer. I do not see illness, infirmity, or limits. In Kuusisto's estimation the idea of normal or mainstream is destructive and he recently "told a group of artists and advocates for people with disabilities at the Kennedy Center for the Arts in Washington, DC that the mainstream is one of the great, tragic ideas of our time. There is no mainstream. No one is physically solid, reliable, capable as a solo act, protected against catastrophe; there is only the stream in which each one of us must work to find solace in meaning". This is not only eloquent writing but brilliant thinking in terms of health care: who decides what is "normal" or "mainstream"? The answer is as simple as it is dangerous: the medical industrial complex. The medical industrial complex is much like the military industrial complex I study in my historical work about anthropology. For a military industrial complex to exist, war or the fear of war must be present. Since 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the more recent events of September 11, 2001 we have had an abundance of fear mongering and war. In the medical industrial complex fear is required as well. What do we humans fear? Ill-health, disease, the absence of normalcy and disability. Ill-health is why the medical industrial complex exists. The sick, infirm, and disabled are the primary consumers. The big bucks and profit is in abnormality, exactly what we fear. Healthy people, the mainstream, need not apply. Healthy people are the worst customers. What I want to know is how do we determine what is normal? Who is normal and why are they normal? As one who has not been perceived to be "normal" in thirty years I ask this question because I know power rests among the normate to use Rose Marie Garland-Thompson's awkward term. The normates define and control what it means to be different. These people, normates, dictate not only what is healthy but how ill health is treated. Certain illnesses carry great stigma, AIDS for instance, while others are deemed so rare they are not worth researching (think ALS or Lou Gehrig's Disease). This is why disability studies has much to offer the debate about our health care system--our bodies, disabled bodies, have been medicalized. Disability studies is the one field that is devoted to this subject in the form of why. Why is the disabled body so objectionable? What are the practical and theoretical implications of the rejection of the disabled body? Policy makers, if they were smart, would listen carefully to what disability studies scholars have to say. We people with a disability are the best customers of the medical industrial complex. The problem is that we people with a disability and by extension disability studies scholars are outsiders. The debate over health care is dictated by people like Peter Signer and others who want to get the most bang for their buck and know nothing about disability. I am not dismissing the great cost involved in disability. I am intimately familiar with this. Rather, I want to point out what many know but do not acknowledge: the greatest economic savings do not rest among those that are ill or disabled. If we want to save money and lives the greatest economic and human savings are to found keeping people healthy. Healthy people, normates, are cheap and powerful. The normate, those that control the medical industrial complex, profit from illness. The largest profits are made diagnosing and treating the sick who get well. Just ask anyone that has undergone basic diagnostic testing, medical treatment and been deemed healthy afterwards. The money, capitalistic profit and core of our medical industrial complex, is dependent upon abnormality. Money is made when the medical industrial complex finds perceived pathology. Our perception of what is normal has become increasingly narrow. The reason is simple--profits. The more abnormal one becomes the greater the profit margin. We crippled people have become too costly and will be the direct targets of cost saving measures. Worse, our costly asses are not valued and it is all too easy to moan and groan about the costs of disability and old age. Why treat an elderly person who will die in the near future? Why should an insurance company pay for a $5,000 wheelchair when a wheelchair for $500 will suffice? These sorts of decisions are short sighted savings and laden with value judgments that keep me up at night. If we want to save money this is what I propose: make basic health care affordable. Lower the price of medications for conditions such as high blood pressure so that even the poorest Americans can afford it. If we did this, perhaps what is known as the stroke belt among black Americans in the Southeast would not exist. Force people to live a healthy life style via gut wrenching taxes. If you want to smoke make it cost prohibitive. Raise the price of cigarettes by $10 a pack every year for the next five years and few people will smoke. If we don't want kids to drink soda and eat unhealthy foods ban them from schools. Tax soda and junk foods so severely they are unaffordable. I am not naive. I know we lack the resolve to follow through on my outlandish suggestions. I also know if we did it would have a profound and unsettling impact on our economy; in other words corporations would suffer. Our government will never let this happen and this is part of the problem I am trying to emphasize with my extreme examples. Disability has been eliminated from the discourse on health care reform or perhaps more accurately it is framed only as it pertains to "savings". That is disability is abnormality, costly, and must be reduced. To me, this is akin to targeting and eliminating what makes us so special and diverse. The advances in our medical industrial complex have created more diversity--I see people at adaptive sports programs that are amazingly unique. I marvel at the human spirit and adaptive ability we all possess. I am equally sad to know that physical and cognitive disability is stigmatized and there are times this knowledge makes me ashamed to be human. Let me make one final point in this long and rambling post. I am not opposed to rationing health care. I can live with rationing health care but I can only do so if all are treated equally. Based on what I read and sense, we people with a disability are in for a very rough experience. Disability scholars may not have all the answers or even some of the answers but they must be part of the debate. The elderly, chronically ill, long term cancer survivors, people with a disability all have experience with our flawed health system and yet they are not sitting down to talk with President Obama or his advisors. This has me worried. People with first hand experience need to play a central role in any discussion about the medical industrial complex. I do not see this taking place and cannot help but conclude the so called health care reform in retrospect may seem like the biggest corporate grab for wealth our nation will ever witness. And who will get hurt the most? Why of course those that are the most vulnerable.

**Ableism’s constitutional divide forms the blueprint for modernity – this culminates in genocidal violence and targeting of marginalized bodies – this violence can only maintain power through our silence**

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II. “Ableist Relations”

**Central to** regimes of **ableism are two core elements that feature irrespective of its localised enactment, namely the notion of the normative** (and normate individual) **and the enforcement of a constitutional divide between perfected naturalized humanity and the aberrant, the unthinkable, quasi-human hybrid and therefore non-human. This** constitution **provides the** layout, the **blueprint for the scaling and marking of bodies and the ordering of their terms of relation. It is not possible to have a concept of difference without Ableism.** Let’s take each of these two elements separately and explore them more closely. The Able/Not-Able Divide **It is necessary to establish and enforce a constitutional divide. The divide is at the levels of ontology, materiality and sentiency**. I wish to focus on the constitutionality of that divide between the normal and the pathological and mechanisms of ordering. This analysis is influenced by the proposals advanced by Bruno Latour in We Have Never been Modern. Latour speaks of the practices of translation and purification: … ‘**translation’, creates mixtures between entirely new types of being, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification’: creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other** (10 - 11). The devices of **translation and purification can assist us to grapple with that which seems ‘unholdable’ and elusive; the uncontainability of the disabled body**. ‘Translation’ is based on the notion that **structures or networks are not obvious or self-contained**. Latour uses the example of a chain flowing from the upper atmosphere, industrial strategies and onto the concerns of government and greenies. ‘**Purification’ in contrast, engages in the creation of divides of ontological distinctions, which espouse a foundational** (almost first cause) **self-evidence**. Here, Latour cites that partition between nature (as self contained), nonhumans and culture (created and driven by humans). **This ‘modern critical stance’**, as Latour calls it, **acts as the ethos or template of modernity.** In the context of ableism, Latour’s schema proves helpful. The processes and practices of translation cannot be separated from the creation of that ordering category termed ‘disability’. For many people deemed disabled, in the world of technoscience their relationship with non-human actants has been profoundly cyborgical and hybridisable (for example the use of communication and adaptive devices, implants and transplants). As such the networks of association between human – non human (sentient beings and machines) have always been and increasingly are pushing the boundaries of the practices of purification. **The disabled body induces a fear as being a body out of control because of its appearance of uncontainability. The practices of purification insist on this being the case. Ableism’s constitutional divide posits two distinct and entirely clear ontological zones: disabled and abled (normate). Latour explains …without the first set, the practices of purification would be fruitless or pointless. Without the second, the work of translation would be slowed down, limited, or even ruled out. … So long as we consider these two practices of translation and purification separately, we are truly modern –** that is willingly subscribe to the critical project, even though that project is developed only through the proliferation of hybrids down below. **As soon as we direct our attention simultaneously to the work of purification and the work of hybridization [translation], we immediately stop being wholly modern, and our future begins to change**. (11) **The challenge then is to look beyond social context, at the interactivity between the processes and techniques of purification and translation,** in particular to investigate what this interactivity clarifies and obfuscates. Even though Latour claims that purification is not an ideology in disguise, I would assert that the **existence of processes of purification creates a simulation if you like, of the conditions of naturalism.** Latour’s discussion of whether relations are conscious and unconscious, or are illusion and reality is an important one. He concludes that **moderns are not unaware of what they do; rather it is the holding steadfast to dichotomies, the divides, which makes possible the processes of translation.** We can by analogy, argue that **matters of intentionality or discourse and so forth, are not critical to the emerging technologies of ableism, but rather it is the act of holding stoically to the distinction between ableness and disabledness.** In contemporary developments in high-tech and biotechnologies, it is occasionally possible to witness the glitches in the purview of purification, whether that is in the debates over transhumanism, xenotransplantation or the emergent of new ‘life’ in the form of artificial intelligences (A.I’s). The confusion about where human life begins and ends harks back to the Enlightenment era where philosophers like Locke inquired “What is It?” in trying to make sense of the humanness of changelings (Campbell; Locke,). The fortunes of techno-science continue to disrupt the fixity of defining disability and normalcy especially within the arenas of law and bioethics. Whilst anomalous bodies are undecidable in being open to endless and differing interpretations, an essentialised disabled body is subjected to constant deferral – standing in reserve, awaiting and escaping able(edness) through morphing technologies and as such exists in an ontologically tentative or provisional state. **Latour points out the ultimate paradox of this modern constitutional divide is that whilst the proliferation of hybrids is allowed for, at the same time this constitution continues to deny the very existence of hybrid entities within its formulation** (Latour). Contemporary **conditions suggest that it is not the event of denial that is operational; rather it is the ‘place’ or significance given to such ambiguous entities that disrupt the rather neat demarcation zones. Practices of purification continue to rein in** (successfully or otherwise) **the chaos created by increasing ‘grey zones’ along the continuum of human/nonhuman difference**. In the governing of prostitution, Razack points to the creation of ‘anomalous zone’ to contain and tolerate the deviance. **In dealing with political prisoners, the despised, those interned in concentration camps and institutions,** Agamben indicates the **manufacturing of states of exception that exist beyond the law and spatiality to enable ‘treatments’ of those existing in the realm of a bare life.** The **significance of the enforcement of a constitutional divide, for the practices of ableism, is that such orderings are not just repressive but they are ultimately productive; they tell us stories, they contain narratives as to ‘who’ we are and how we ‘should be’.** In the closing pages of We Have Never been Modern, Latour argues that as science creates new definitions of being human, these new formations do not displace the older versions rather humanism is redistributed. I am not entirely convinced of this emergent multiplicity and expansion of ontologies of humanness. Contra Latour, Hayles argues that should sentiency be conceptualised on the basis of informationalcy this new rendering would amount to a profound shift in the theoretical markers used to categorise all life (or what is ‘life’). In this moment there is a rallying of networks scurrying to squeeze new ontological formations of dis/ability into ‘old’ systems of ordering and thus attempt to avoid re-cognising an abundance of (post marginal, post peripheral) morphisms. Anthropomorphism becomes the catch cry of ableism. As Latour rejoices: Morphism is the place where technomorpisms, zoomorphisms, phusimorphisms,ideomorphisms,theomorphisms, sociomorphisms, psyomorphisms, all come together. These alliances and their exchanges, taken together, are what define the anthropos. A weaver of morphisms - isn’t that enough of a definition? (137) What Normate … Ableist Normativity? Georges Canguilhem (69) states “every generality is the sign of an essence, and every perfection the realization of the essence … a common characteristic, the value of an ideal type”. If this is the case, **what then is the essence of normative abled(ness)? Such a question poses significant conceptual challenges including the dangers of bifurcation. It is reasonably easy to speculate about the knowingness of life forms deemed disabled in spite of the neologism of disability’s catachresis orientation**. In contrast – **able-bodied, corporeal perfectedness has an elusive core** (other than being posed as transparently average or normal). **Charting a criterion of Abled to gain definitional clarity can result in a game of circular reductionism** – saying what it is in relation to what it isn’t, that which falls away. **Disability performances are invoked to mean “any body capable of being narrated as outside the norm”** (Mitchell 17). Such as analysis belies the issue whether at their core women’s, black and queer bodies are ultimately ontologically and materially disabled? **Inscribing certain bodies in terms of deficiency and essential inadequacy privileges a particular understanding of normalcy that is commensurate with the interests of dominant groups** (and the assumed interests of subordinated groups). Indeed, the **formation of ableist relations requires the normate individual to depend upon the self of ‘disabled’ bodies being rendered beyond the realm of civility, thus becoming an unthinkable object of apprehension**. The **unruly, uncivil, disabled body is necessary for the reiteration of the ‘truth’ of the ‘real/essential’ human self who is endowed with masculinist attributes of certainty, mastery and autonomy**. The **discursive practices that mark out bodies of preferability are vindicated by abject life forms that populate the constitutive outside of the thinkable** (that which can be imagined and re-presented) **and** those **forms of existence that are unimaginable and therefore unspeakable.** The **emptying** (kenosis) **of normalcy occurs through the purging of those beings that confuse, are misrecognizable** or as Mitchell (17) describes **as “recalcitrant corporeal matter” into a bare life** (see Agamben) **residing in zone of exceptionality. This foreclosure depends on necessary unspeakability to maintain the continued operation of hegemonic power** (c.f. Butler). **For every outside there is an inside that demands differentiation and consolidation as a unity**. To borrow from Heidegger– in every aletheia (unveiling or revealedness) of representation there lies a concealedness. The **visibility of the ableist project is therefore only possible through the interrogation of the revealedness of disability/not-health and abled(ness).** Marcel Detienne summarizes this system of thought aptly: **[Such a] … system is founded on a series of acts of partition whose ambiguity, here as elsewhere, is to open up the terrain of their transgression at the very moment when they mark off a limit. To discover the complete horizon of a society’s symbolic values, it is also necessary to map out its transgressions, its deviants** ( ix). Viewing the disabled body as simply matter out of place that needs to dispensed with or at least cleaned up is erroneous. The disabled body has a place, a place in liminality to secure the performative enactment of the normal. Detienne’s summation points to what we may call the double bind of ableism when performed within western neo-liberal polities. The double bind folds in on itself – for whilst claiming ‘inclusion’, ableism simultaneously always restates and enshrines itself. On the one hand, discourses of equality promote ‘inclusion’ by way of promoting positive attitudes (sometimes legislated in mission statements, marketing campaigns, equal opportunity protections) and yet on the other hand, ableist discourses proclaim quite emphatically that disability is inherently negative, ontologically intolerable – and in the end a dispensable remnant. This casting results in an ontological foreclosure wherein positive signification of disability becomes unspeakable. Disability can’t be thought of/spoken about on any other basis than the negative, to do so, to invoke oppositional discourses, is to run the risk of further pathologisation. An example of this are attempts at desiring or celebrating disability which are reduced to a fetish or facticity disorder. So to explicate ourselves out of this double bind we need to persistently and continually return to the matter of disability as negative ontology, as a malignancy, that is, as the property of a body constituted by what Michael Oliver refers to as, “the personal tragedy theory of disability.” (32) Returning to the matter of definitional clarity around Abled(ness). Robert McRuer is one of the few scholars to journey into ableism’s non-axiomatic life. He argues that ableism (McRuer refers to compulsory abled-bodiedness) emanates from everywhere and nowhere, and can only be deduced by crafty reductionisms. Contra the assertions about the uncontainability of disabled bodies which are (re)contained by the hyper prescription and enumeration, the abled body mediated through its assumption of compulsion is absent in its presence – it just is – but resists being fully deducible. Drawing on Butler’s work, McRuer writes everyone is virtually disabled, both in the sense that able-bodied norms are ‘intrinsically impossible to embody’ fully and in the sense that able-bodied status is always temporary, disability being the one identity category that all people will embody if they live long enough. What we might call a critically disability position, however, would differ from such a virtually disabled position [to engagements that have] resisted the demands of compulsory able-bodiedness … (95–96) My argument is that insofar as this conception of disability is assumed within discourses of ableism, the presence of disability upsets the modernist craving for ontological security. The conundrum disability is not a mere fear of the unknown, nor an apprehensiveness towards that which is foreign or strange. Rather, disability and disabled bodies are effectively positioned in the nether regions of ‘unthought’. For the ongoing stability of ableism, a diffuse network of thought depends upon the capacity of that network to ‘shut away’, to exteriorise, and unthink disability and its resemblance to the essential (ableist) human self. This unthought has been given much consideration through the systematisation and classification of knowledges about pathology, aberration and deviance. That which is thought about (the Abled norm) rather ironically in its delimitation becomes vacuous and elusive. In order for the notion of ableness to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject, the normate individual of liberalism, it must have a constitutive outside – that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity. When looking at relations of disability and ableism we can expand on this idea of symbiosis, an ‘unavoidable duality’ by putting forward another metaphor, that of the mirror. Here I argue that people deemed disabled take on the performative act of mirroring in the lives of normative subjects: To be a Mirror is different from being a Face that looks back … with a range of expression and responsiveness that are responses of a Subject-in-Its-Own-Right. To be positioned as a Mirror is to be Put Out of Countenance, to Lose Face. (Narayan 141) In this respect, we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, to be put out of countenance; this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to mere absence or exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness (cf. Overboe ) on the idea of normative shadows). Disability’s truth-claims are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimization. III. Disability Imaginaries – Reconceptualising the Human? Phenomenological studies have long recognized the importance of focusing on the experience of the animated living body (der Leib), in recognition that we dwell in our bodies and live so fundamentally through them. This intensity is captured by Kalekin-Fishman: Before every action, there is a pause ... and a beginning again. The pause is for description, for mulling over the requirements of balance, for comparing the proposed action with movements that are familiar, and for explaining to myself why I can or cannot do what is at hand ... In the course of daily living, the thinking is not observable; the behavior just happens, part of what this person does naturally. The physiology of ‘a slight limp’ is part of the unmediated expression of what my ‘I’ is ... (136) In short, we cannot ‘know’ existence without being rooted to our bodies. To this extent, **it is problematic to speak of bodies in their materiality in a way that distinguishes between emotions and cognition. This generative body is shaped by relations of power, complex histories and interpreted through a bricolage of complex interwoven subjectivities. This approach to perceiving the body in terms of geist or animation can be applied to re-thinking peripheral bodies deemed disabled. It is this body that infuses the discourses and animates representations. Refusing Able(ness) necessitates a letting go of the strategy of using the sameness for equality arguments as the basis of liberal freedom. Instead of wasting time on the violence of normalization, theoretical and cultural producers could more meaningfully concentrate on developing a semiotics of exchange, an ontological decoder to recover and apprehend the lifeworlds of humans living peripherally. Ontological differences, be that on the basis of problematical signifiers of race, sex, sexuality and dis/ability, need to be unhinged from evaluative ranking and be re-cognised in their various nuances and complexities without being re-presented in fixed absolute terms. It is only then, in this release that we can find possibilities in ambiguity and resistance in marginality** (cf. de Beauvoir; hooks). Instead of asking “how do you manage not being like (the non-stated) us?” (the negation argument), **disability imaginaries think/speak/gesture and feel different landscapes not just for being –in-the-world, but on the conduction of perception, mobilities and temporalities**. Linton points out that the “kinaesthetic, proprioceptive, sensory and cognitive experiences” of disabled people as they go about their daily life has received limited attention. Nancy Mairs notes a disability gaze is imbricated in every aspect of action, perception, occurrence and knowing. In order to return bodies back to difference–in-the-human, a **re-conceptualization of knowing** (episteme) **is paramount. Only this knowledge is of a carnal kind, where thinking, sensing and understanding mutually enfold. Whilst ever present in ableist normalising dialogue, disability’s veracity is undeniably contingent upon conversations of ableism, its production and performance, to confer validity.**

#### Disability is at the center of the topic. Our society has told disabled people that their bodies are not their own to control—that their bodies must adhere to an ablebodied norm of how bodies are “supposed to be.” While a vote for the affirmative endorses the normative statement that “Adolescents ought to have the right to make autonomous medical decisions”, it is also a vote for a radical struggle to reclaim our conception of normality and autonomy from a medicalized society.

Mingus 8 (Mia Mingus, Co-Executive Director, SPARK! Reproductive Justice Now, “ON CLAIMING MY MOVEMENT: DISABILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE”, 2008)//Miro

It is not a coincidence that I ended up working in a movement that is fundamentally rooted in the idea that certain bodies are valuable and others are not; in a movement that is so connected with the world of healthcare and medicine - the reproductive justice movement. Reproductive justice and disability are connected on a deeply fundamental level. Disabled people, issues, history, politics and analysis allow us to see parts of reproductive justice that we would otherwise never know. After all, how can you talk about bodies without talking about disability? How can you ignore the fact that disabled women are often forcibly sterilized or given dangerous contraceptives to control their menstrual cycles for the convenience of their caretakers and institutions? How can we learn to fight for not only the right to receive care, but also the right to refuse it? How can we forget that female bodies were historically coded as “disabled” because they were “different” and had “different abilities” than male bodies? Or that ableism is so easily and successfully used as a mechanism of reproductive oppression? As women of color, people with disabilities, LGBTI and queer people, and survivors of violence and trauma, the struggle to claim our bodies for ourselves--in all of our bodies’ curious, strange, beautiful and glorious ways--cannot be separated from reproductive justice. As communities whose bodies have been owned, experimented on, institutionalized, hospitalized, medicalized, colonized, imprisoned, enslaved and controlled, we have been told that our bodies are wrong, perverse, shameful, bad, and most importantly; that our bodies are not ours; that they belong to the state, our parents, husbands, partners, doctors, children, families, communities, god(s), and so on. I grew out of a very strong feminist, women of color, activist, close-knit community working to end violence against women and children. Early on, I learned about sexism, racism, economic injustice and homophobia; that there was no hierarchy of oppression; that systems of oppression were connected to each other, intersected and overlapped. Despite such a strong framework, no one ever taught me to think of disability in the same way and connect it to being Asian American, a woman, young or queer. No one ever taught me that being disabled was a powerful way to move through the world or that disabled communities had rich and vibrant cultures of their own. I was taught to claim my body as a girl, female, and woman, but not as a disabled person. When it came to my disability, my parents looked to doctors, healthcare providers, medical experts and brace makers. I was not the expert on my body; they were. It never occurred to anyone that the ability to claim my body as a girl was dependent on my ability to claim my disabled body as a disabled girl. No one ever realized that my experiences with the medical industrial complex as a disabled child would ultimately discourage me from seeking medical services (reproductive or not) in the future - or that standing in my underwear in front of male doctors as they studied me was any different than standing in my underwear in front of any old men as they studied me. Growing up disabled, my body profoundly affected how I viewed the world and in turn, how the world viewed me. School became a site where the politics of beauty, disability, race, sexuality and gender collided. I never saw disabled women (let alone disabled women of color) in powerful roles, being desired or desiring, raising families or claiming their disability as a political identity, rather than an individual flaw or tragedy. One of my earliest memories of consciously claiming my body for myself was deciding not to wear my brace any more. For years I wore a brace on my right leg; I had to get them re-made or re-fitted almost every year as I grew out of them. I had some that went from my foot to my knee and some that went all the way up to my hip. For a long time I did not question my brace. It was just the way things were, like stairs, people staring at me when I walked, or feeling ashamed of my disability. Among many things, my braces were hot (often made of plastic and or fiberglass), and in the Virgin Islands Caribbean weather, they itched, pinched my skin, and gave me painful blisters which I would try to prevent by wearing more socks or padding. Like my parents, I had come to believe that I “needed” to wear my brace. But something began to change as I entered middle school. I began to ask questions: why should I have to wear something so painful everyday that is supposed to “help” me? If they can send a man to the moon, then surely they can make a comfortable and useful brace for my leg? In the beginning I had small acts of resistance: the daily morning fight about putting my brace on or bringing a change of shoes and changing out of it once I was at school--this went on for years. Finally I was “allowed” to not wear my brace some days, and it was not until I was in college that I was able to choose not to wear my brace everyday. For me, my brace represented the medical establishment’s grubby little hands on my body, forcing me to adhere to a standardized, able bodied norm of how bodies are supposed to be, look, act and move. When I wore it, I could hear horrible brace maker’s voices in my head, “that’s an ugly walk,” “walk down the hallway again and this time, try and make it prettier,” “this brace will make you have a normal walk,” or “don’t worry, you’ll be able to hide the brace under your clothes--boys won’t even know it’s there.” It represented years of someone else deciding what was best for my body and the invasion (physical and mental) of my body at a young age by people who never asked me what I thought about having multiple surgeries done at the same time; how I felt being told that my body was “wrong” and “something to fix” over and over again. All that time, I never knew that there was a whole movement out there of disabled people demanding justice and human rights. The ownership and entitlement of the medical industrial complex of my disabled body is, in my mind, no worse than the ownership and entitlement of the system of white supremacy of my body of color; or the system of male supremacy of my female body. In fact, they are so connected and mutually interdependent that they are impossible to separate. Claiming my body has been and continues to be a pivotal process in my own life. Knowing and learning to understand my disabled body as powerful, beautiful, valuable and desirable has been central to my activism in the reproductive justice movement. For me, reproductive justice will always include a radical analysis of disability and ableist supremacy because they are part of each other and they are a part of me.

#### While we have debate after debate about “adolescent autonomy”, we never question the ableist foundation of the conception of “autonomy.” The Aff functions as a destabilization of the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity in favor of a view that we are *all broken.*

Hughes 07 (Bill Hughes, Glasgow Caledonian University, “Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies, 2007)//Miro

Whilst borrowing from black culture smacks of cool and complicates but adorns the self-identity and existential coherence of some white people, non-disabled people are very unlikely to open themselves in a similar fashion to the ‘disabled other’, since it raises the question of their own vulnerability and embodied coherence and illuminates the challenges posed by the very existential questions from which they try to protect themselves. The love of coherence and order, the ‘natural attitude’ that people adopt to shield themselves from the vicissitudes of existence, particularly in our age of anxiety, forms a force field that keeps the threat of vulnerability, the approaching stranger, at bay. It is, to put the argument another way, the normative, invulnerable body of disablist modernity that is the problem. Indeed, the invulnerable self is a fantasy and form of self-deception associated with carnal ‘normalcy’. It is widely used by non-disabled people to create and sustain social distance between disabled and non-disabled people. One can use Tom Shakespeare’s work from the mid 1990s to develop this argument. Shakespeare (1994, p. 298) argued that non-disabled people ‘project their fear of death, their unease at their physicality and mortality onto disabled people, who represent all these difficult aspects of human existence’. There are two important elements involved in this psychoemotional and social process that results in the ‘disavowal of disability’ and its invalidation as a worthwhile existential status. One is psychological and the other ontological. The first is fear of physical frailty, bodily difference and social vulnerability that is projected onto the disabled other and the second is the process by which the social distancing associated with projected fear is frozen into a binary of being that embodies a hierarchy of existence. Ironically, the ontological insecurity of non-disabled identity is the original sin that pushes disabled people to the margins of the human community. Disability is not an outcome of the infraction of social norms about ‘normalcy’ but a product of the failure of carnal normalcy to take proper account of itself, to indulge in ‘bad faith’ and delude itself into thinking that it is exempt from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. The problem rests with the normative body that does not want to be reminded of its own vulnerability or to admit that abjection and death is its fate. In this context the disabled body is troublesome because it ‘exposes the illusion of autonomy, self-government and self-determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute able bodiedness’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 45). Readers may have noticed in this very preliminary and adumbrated account of what a critical social ontology for disability studies might look like a measure of intellectual affinity with one of the key building blocks of the critique of the individual and medical model’s of disability (and ergo of the social model of disability), namely ‘personal tragedy theory’ (Oliver, 1990). This concept need not be reduced to issues of compensation, entitlement or therapeutic interventions (Oliver, 1996, p. 131; Kumari Campbell, 2005) but is closely articulated with the negative and invalidating way in which non-disabled people relate to disabled people and the threat that this poses to the ‘psycho-emotional well-being’ of disabled people (Thomas, 1999). Fiona Kumari Campbell (2005, p. 109) argued that, almost without fail in modern discourse, disability ‘is assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is, inherently negative’ and ‘always present … in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness’. The assumption that a disabled life is ubiquitously, even invariably, blighted and aberrant is spliced into the emotion of pity that underpins disability charity (Smith, 2005), into the ‘practices and effects of the law’ (Kumari Campbell, 2005), into conceptions and practices of care (Hughes et al., 2005), into the humiliations and violations of institutional life (Malacrida, 2005), into the order of things, into everyday subjectivity. One could go one better, extending the (recently researched) list of realms in which the authenticity of disability is implicitly or explicitly questioned, the blight of oppression felt and ontological recognition denied. It is the task of a critical social ontology for disability studies to claim authenticity for disability whenever it is denied, be it in the cold logic of Peter Singer’s

#### The role of the judge is to act as a critical educator combating oppression—while obviously signing the ballot won’t make ableism disappear, voting for strategies to combat oppression *in this round* makes us better activists in the future.

Giroux 13 (Henry, American scholar and cultural critic. One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy, “Public Intellectuals Against the Neoliberal University,” 29 October 2013, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19654-public-intellectuals-against-the-neoliberal-university)//ghs-VA> (yep, I hadn’t cut a new ROTB until later in my career)

Increasingly, as universities are shaped by an audit culture, the call to be objective and impartial, whatever one's intentions, can easily echo what George Orwell called the official truth or the establishment point of view. Lacking a self-consciously democratic political focus, teachers are often reduced, or reduce themselves, to the role of a technician or functionary engaged in formalistic rituals, unconcerned with the disturbing and urgent problems that confront the larger society or the consequences of one's pedagogical practices and research undertakings. Hiding behind appeals to balance and objectivity, too many scholars refuse to recognize that being committed to something does not cancel out what C. Wright Mills once called hard thinking. Teaching needs to be rigorous, self-reflective, and committed not to the dead zone of instrumental rationality but to the practice of freedom, to a critical sensibility capable of advancing the parameters of knowledge, addressing crucial social issues, and connecting private troubles and public issues. In opposition to the instrumental model of teaching, with its conceit of political neutrality and its fetishization of measurement, I argue that academics should combine the mutually interdependent roles of critical educator and active citizen. This requires finding ways to connect the practice of classroom teaching with important social problems and the operation of power in the larger society while providing the conditions for students to view themselves as critical agents capable of making those who exercise authority and power answerable for their actions. Higher education cannot be decoupled from what Jacques Derrida calls a democracy to come, that is, a democracy that must always "be open to the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself."33 Within this project of possibility and impossibility, critical pedagogy must be understood as a deliberately informed and purposeful political and moral practice, as opposed to one that is either doctrinaire, instrumentalized or both. Moreover, a critical pedagogy should also gain part of its momentum in higher education among students who will go back to the schools, churches, synagogues and workplaces to produce new ideas, concepts and critical ways of understanding the world in which young people and adults live. This is a notion of intellectual practice and responsibility that refuses the professional neutrality and privileged isolation of the academy. It also affirms a broader vision of learning that links knowledge to the power of self-definition and to the capacities of students to expand the scope of democratic freedoms, particularly those that address the crisis of education, politics, and the social as part and parcel of the crisis of democracy itself. In order for critical pedagogy, dialogue and thought to have real effects, they must advocate that all citizens, old and young, are equally entitled, if not equally empowered, to shape the society in which they live. This is a commitment we heard articulated by the brave students who fought tuition hikes and the destruction of civil liberties and social provisions in Quebec and to a lesser degree in the Occupy Wall Street movement. If educators are to function as public intellectuals, they need to listen to young people who are producing a new language in order to talk about inequality and power relations, attempting to create alternative democratic public spaces, rethinking the very nature of politics, and asking serious questions about what democracy is and why it no longer exists in many neoliberal societies. These young people who are protesting the 1% recognize that they have been written out of the discourses of justice, equality and democracy and are not only resisting how neoliberalism has made them expendable, they are arguing for a collective future very different from the one that is on display in the current political and economic systems in which they feel trapped. These brave youth are insisting that the relationship between knowledge and power can be emancipatory, that their histories and experiences matter, and that what they say and do counts in their struggle to unlearn dominating privileges, productively reconstruct their relations with others, and transform, when necessary, the world around them.

#### Best for activism— Talking about methodologies to combat oppressive structures makes us better advocates in the future—this is a key pre-requisite to education and fairness claims, even if we learn from debate, that education is useless without the ability to put it to use.

#### The liberal subject constituted by the traditional ethics is assumed to be able-bodied – a focus on disabled people is key

Breckenridge 1 (Carol Appadurai and Candace A Volger, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism”, Public Culture, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2011)

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

#### Body focus is the key enframing in this round—it privileges layers of analysis far too often ignored in contemporary academia.

**Knoll 12**, Kristine Knoll studies Gender and Women’s studies at the University of Washington, Feminist Disability Studies: Theoretical Debates, Activism, Identity Politics, & Coalition Building, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/20505/Knoll\_washington\_0250E\_10341.pdf.txt?sequence=2

Alison Kafer also noted how **disability studies gave more depth to her cultural analyses of bodies, even beyond disability to additional bodily experiences such as queerness:** I do think that **disability studies has pushed me to think of the specificities of Bodies maybe in ways I don’t know if I would have otherwise**. I mean feminist studies and feminist theories are very much interested in bodies. And there are feminists who donâ€™t do disability who talk about embodiment and embodied experience, but I think **disability studies helped me see that more. It** actually **made me think about bodies in their particularity, about the different cultural weights different kinds of bodies bear, and about bodies in terms of feminist, queer, or crip resistance**.31 **Disability studies provides new layers of analyses for bodily experiences from the intersectional influences of sexism and ableism on feminism to the influences of compulsory heterosexuality and able-bodiedness on queerness.**

#### The Aff is necessary to disrupt and expose structures of ableism that make liberal violence possible – this is a form of transgressive politics

Campbell 98, Associate Professor in Law, Griffith Law School, Griffith University, Australia and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Department of Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Fiona, THE “DISABLISED” BODY: An Inquiry into the Corporeality of “Disability” and Social Role Valorisation Theory, https://www.academia.edu/1914452/THE\_DISABLISED\_BODY\_An\_Inquiry\_into\_the\_Corporeality\_of\_Disability\_and\_Social\_Role\_Valorisation\_Theory

My method is that of discourse analysis. As Foucault (1980a: 52) explains **“the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power”. Foucault** once **suggested** that **his work should be used as “little tool boxes**” and this thesis takes up that offer (Morris 1979: 115). Amongst other things, **Foucault’s** method of **discourse analysis enables an examination into the way “disability” is put into discourse, acknowledging that the terrain of discourse is itself a site of struggle and competition** (Foucault 1976: 11; Foucault 1984a: 110). Discourse Analysis can be undertaken in a threefold manner. First, by examining at the textual level the way “disability” is put into specific narratives - be they historical or theoretical; secondly, at a discursive level, it is possible to reveal patterns (uneven as they may be) related to the representation of “normative” corporeal ontologies and inquire into what has been excluded, minimised, been disqualified or has been considered marginal (Foucault 1980b: 82); Thirdly, at the level of the “social”, such **analysis enables** the **operation of sovereign power in the form of ideology and hegemonic technologies to be revealed exposing liberalism’s figuring of the sovereign “individual” as a fabrication**.12 In order **to name** the **violence - epistemic, psychic, ontological, physical experienced by people whose bodies have been marked as corporeally intolerable or ambiguous,** the **extrication of discursive formations can reveal the concealed “gaze” of the “underlying subject” of discourse; the pursuit/conformation of the phantomological body of the liberal self**.13 I want to show that **there is an intrinsic link between the production of sovereign selves, ways relationality and embodiment are understood and the figuring of “disablised” bodies, as othered**. The **use of Foucault’s genealogical method provides “reading strategies” to foreground discourse “in operation, in a specific historical context [and] see whose interests it serves at a particular moment” as well as unmask such things as discursive manoeuvres and recuperative strategies** (Weedon 1997: 108). As Stuart Hall puts it: …[**Discourse] examines** not only how language and representation produce meaning, but **how** the **knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented, thought about, practised or studied.** (Hall 1997: 6) The danger otherwise, is to continue to reproduce dominant discourses that represent people with disabilities as passive victims lacking agency. As such, **this thesis is one way of asserting resistance, it is a “transgressive” piece of research, which seeks to “interrupt existing ideologies and exploitations of disability**”14 (Fine quoted in Zarb 1992: 133). In line with this thesis’ focal concerns, the objects of my investigation are those texts concerned with the discursive practices of “disability”: within “history”, social theory and service provision to people with “disabilities”. Of particular interest is Foucault’s analytics of power which employs the analysis of “dividing practices”15 that facilitate techniques of surveillance which “function ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere” (Foucault 1977: 195). Foucault’s conceptualisation of the body in terms of “bio-power”, contributes to a greater understanding of the use of disciplinary practices forming the “disablised” body and the role of technician’s “gaze” which classifies, monitors, modifies and documents the “unruly”, transforming us into “subjected and practiced … ‘docile’ bodies” (Foucault 1977: 138) that reinforce a liberal understanding of self.

## 1AR

### 1AR—campbell

#### I control the *largest impact* in this round—the constitutional divide at the heart of disablist modernity makes zones of exceptionality *the norm—*our society “purges” bodies that it deems unrecognizable, that is disabled people, people of color, and queer people—this culminates in genocidal violence. And I control uniqueness on their impact claims, abberant, disabled people already occupy a place of “ontological intolerability”—there’s only a risk that we make their lives better—that’s Campbell.

### 1AR—method

#### The Affirmative is a method of destabilizing the normative, invulnerable body underpinning disablist modernity—by giving disabled adolescents, a *choice*, by letting them radically reclaim *their body as their own*, the Aff exposes the illusion underpinning modern conceptions of autonomy as freedom—that’s the Hughes evidence.

### 1AR—ROTJ

#### The role of the judge is to act as a critical educator, this is key-- two reasons—

#### While obviously voting Aff doesn’t get rid of ableism, we do take the knowledge we gain in debate out of the round—voting Aff affirms my method as a good form of politics.

#### Advocacy skills—forcing us to have a debate over methodologies combatting oppression allows us to develop advocacies skills that we can use to combat oppression in *all spaces* not just debate.—That’s Giroux.

#### <<That means that this debate is over methodologies to combat oppression>>

### 1AR—Root cause

#### Social constructions of disability are the root cause of other forms of oppression. Challenging these assumptions is key – true politics is impossible within the paradigm of ableism – the role of the ballot is to endorse the best disability scholarship.

Siebers 10 [Tobin, Professor of English at the University of Michigan, Disability Aesthetics, pg. 58-63]

These two episodes may seem worlds apart, their resemblance superficial. The first turns on questions of aesthetic taste. The second is about political inclusion. But they express with equal power the current struggles in the United States about the ideal of a common culture. Do certain kinds of bodies have greater civil rights than others? Which is more important, the baby's body or the mother's body? Who should bear the cost to make public buildings accessible to people with disabilities? Who gets to have sex with whom? Whose bloodlines will Americans claim as their birthright? These are political questions for the simple reason that they determine who gains membership, and who does not, in the body politic, but the apparent oddity of the culture wars consists in the fact that the debates over these questions have used aesthetic rather than political arguments. The flash points in the battle are not on the senate floor or in the chambers of the powerful but in classrooms, museums, theaters, concert halls, and other places of culture. Opposing sides tend not to debate political problems directly, focusing instead on the value of reading certain books, the decency of photographs, paintings, and statues, the offensiveness of performances and gestures, the bounds of pornography, the limits of good taste. The culture wars are supposed to be more about who gets into the culture than who has culture, and yet it is difficult to raise one issue without raising the other. Aesthetics tracks the emotions that some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies, but aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust are difficult to separate from political feelings of acceptance and rejection. The oppression of women, gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, blacks, and other ethnic groups often takes the form of an aesthetic judgment, though a warped one, about their bodies and the emotions elicited by them. Their actions are called sick, their appearance judged obscene or disgusting, their mind depraved, their influence likened to a cancer attacking the healthy body of society. Such metaphors not only bring the idea of the disabled body to mind but represent the rejected political body as disabled in some way. The culture wars appear to be as much about the mental competence to render judgment, the capacity to taste, and the physical ability to experience sensations as about a variety of controversial judgments, tastes, and feelings. They are as much about the shapes of the individual bodies accepted or rejected by the body politic as about the imagination of a common culture. The status of disability, then, is not just one controversy among others in the American culture wars. Disability is in one way or another the key concept by which the major controversies at the heart of the culture wars are presented to the public sphere, and through which the voting public will eventually render its decisions on matters both political and aesthetic. For to listen to opposing sides, the culture wars are about nothing more or less than the collective health of the United States. The culture wars not only represent minority groups as mentally and physically disabled-and demand their exclusion from the public sphere as a result-they reject works of art that present alternatives to the able body. Only by understanding that health is the underlying theme of the culture wars may we understand that thes,e two trends are related. The most scandalous artists in recent controversies about arts funding, for example, give their works an organic dimension that alludes to bodies gone awry, and these allusions are largely responsible for their shock value. They summon an aesthetic revulsion equivalent to the disgust felt by many persons in face-to-face encounters with people with disabilities, thereby challenging the ideal of a hygienic and homogeneous community.' Karen Finley's avant-garde performances confront the audience with a spectacle of errant body fluids: spermatozoaic alfalfa sprouts and excremental chocolate ooze over her body. In one performance, Lamb of God Hotel, she plays Aggie, a woman using a wheelchair having her diaper changed. Andres Serrano's notorious Piss Christ immerses a day-glow crucifix in a vat of the artist's urine, capturing the startling contradiction of Christianity's all-too-human son of God defiled by a mortal body and its waste fluids. Other photographs by Serrano present abstract expressionist patterns composed of blood and semen, stilllifes arranged with human and animal cadavers, and mug shots of the homeless, criminal, and aged. Robert Mapplethorpe's most memorable photographs capture the homoerotic body and serve it up to a largely heterosexual population. Perhaps his most outrageous work is a self-portrait revealing a bullwhip stuck up his rectum. It summons ideas of the devil as well as S/M practices, of course, but it also presents the image a man who has grown a tail, invoking a body whose deformed shape is less or more than human. These stunning works make a contribution to the history of art by assaulting aesthetic dictates that ally beauty to harmonious form, balance, hygiene, fluidity of expression, and genius. But their shock value owes less to their quibbling with certain aesthetic principles than to the bodies and organic materials presented by them. They represent flash points in the culture wars not only because they challenge how aesthetic culture should be defined but also because they attack the body images used to determine who has the right to live in society. People with disabilities elicit feelings of discomfort, confusion, and resentment because their bodies refuse cure, defy normalization, and threaten to contaminate the rest of society. We display bodies objectionable to the body politic, disrupting the longstanding association between instances of aesthetic form and what Fredric Jameson calls the political unconscious. The political unconscious, I want to argue, enforces a mutual identification between forms of appearance, whether organic, aesthetic, or architectural, and ideal images of the body politic. It accounts for the visceral and defensive response to any body found to disturb society's established image of itself. Jameson, of course, defines the political unconscious as a collective impulse that situates the experience of the human group as the absolute horizon of all interpretation. In fact, the existence of the group is for him so much a part of human experience that he considers the consciousness of individuality itself as a symptom of estrangement from collective life. Notice, however, that the political unconscious has no content other than its ability to reference human community as a formal totality. It exists to ponder social totality, but what it refuses to ponder a vision of community as less than perfect. To conceive social totality at the level of form envisions both objects of human production and bodies as symbols of wholeness. The political unconscious establishes the principle of totality as the methodological standard of all human interpretation. It installs the image of an unbroken community as the horizon of thought, requiring that ideas of incompetent, diseased, defective, or incomplete community be viewed as signs of alienation. This means that the very idea of disability signals the triumph of fallen or defective consciousness, despite the fact that there are no real, existing communities of human beings unaffected by the presence of injury, disease, defect, and incompleteness. In short, the political unconscious is a social imaginary designed to eradicate disability. The political unconscious upholds a delicious ideal of social perfection by insisting that any public body be flawless. It also displaces manifestations of disability from collective consciousness, we will see, through concealment, cosmetic action, motivated forgetting, and rituals of sympathy and pity. Advertisements, media images, buildings, and habitats work to assert the coherence and integrity of society, while public actions like telethons and media representations of heroic cripples mollify the influence of disability. Bodies that cannot be subsumed by ritual and other public action represent a blemish on the face of society, and they must be eliminated, apparently whatever the cost. Diane DeVries provides a familiar account, unfortunately, of the political unconscious at work, of the visceral disgust and accompanying violence often directed at people with disabilities. She reveals that observers of the disabled body often feel compelled to fly into action, to cure or kill the ungainly sight before their eyes. De Vries was born with short arms, no hands, and no legs: once when I was a kid, I was in a wagon and we were in this trailer park, and some kid came up to me with a knife. He said, "Aw, you ain't got no arms, you ain't got no legs, and now you're not gonna have no head." He held me right there, by the neck, and had a little knife. It was one of those bratty kids that do weird things. (Cited by Fine and Asch 48).

### 1AR—“autonomy”

#### I had pretty clear articulations of the Hughes evidence in cross-x: traditional autonomy is assumed to be perfect independence, part of the “normative, invulnerable, autonomous abled body” that is created

### 1AR—Definition of Disability

#### We don’t need a definition of disability because our analysis centers on the way ableism brands bodies as disabled and inferior – their expectation of a clear definition is violent medicalism

Knoll 12, Kristine Knoll studies Gender and Women’s studies at the University of Washington, Feminist Disability Studies: Theoretical Debates, Activism, Identity Politics, & Coalition Building, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/20505/Knoll\_washington\_0250E\_10341.pdf.txt?sequence=2

While the medical model treats impairment and disability as relatively the same, and both as being issues or problems that individual bodies need to address, disability rights movements and disability studies have created a backlash against this disability oppression. The **confusion and controversies over the distinctions between disability and impairment exist within the disability rights and disability studies movements as well. Some make a sharp distinction between impairment and disability, while others question the socially constructed nature of impairment and blur the lines between the two. A few argue that we are all impaired** (e.g. that we all have bodily variations and limitations), **but** that **only some of us face discrimination and stigma,** according to the social and minority model of disability. **People who fight oppression have learned to be good anti-essentialists from a long history of universalizing experiences that have tended to Other and oppress additional identities with a unilateral focus.** With good reason, some disability studies scholars question whether all of our limitations, barriers, and oppressions begin and end with a lack of physical and social access. **Although disability studies scholars do not all agree on how to define the distinctions between impairment and disability, most, if not all, argue that there are social and cultural influences that create a social stratification between those deemed â€œdisabledâ€ and those thus implicitly determined non-disabled. The social-cultural model of disability resists the medical model of disability by taking a more postmodern approach to understanding disability and impairment, pointing out and addressing how we create disability** (and impairment, for some disability studies scholars) by the ways in which environments are socially and physically structured.

# Aff—Theory

## Spec/T

### 1AR—Spec/T

#### I meet— I defend the resolution as a whole as a way of destabilizing the normative body of disablist modernity.

#### This solves for all of their ground claims—they could have gotten links off of the resolution since I defend it, they’ve had over a month to prepare.

#### And this is *predictable*—AC Mingus evidence says that disability is at the *core of the topic*—discussions of disability are uniquely key.

#### Counter-interp— Debate should include teams that advance concrete methodologies to address problems of social justice.

### 1AR—Case=DA

#### Case is a disad to their interpretation—

#### Their interpretation excludes discussion of disabled bodies, which is at the center of the resolution. Unless we forefront a deconstruction of disablist norms, our societies constitutional divide will be replicated, culminating in genocidal violence and creating hierarchies at the foundation of every kind of oppression. – that’s Campbell in 8. Ableism specifically relies upon the invisibility of disabled bodies to constitute the settler, abled, white, male ideal form—their theory perpetuates this invisibility.

### 1AR—Spec—Inf Regress

#### () It’s infinitely regressive—there’s always more I could spec. That means that you should view the debate in terms of *reasonability*, good is *good enough.*

#### This prove that <<they>> set an arbitrary bright-line

#### causes theory prolif. Neg can always nitpick further details. The substance crowd-out impact is conceded from the AC. The zero educational value outweighs on magnitude even if fairness comes first general.

#### the topic’s the only universally agreed upon standard, which means it’s the least arbitrary brightline for spec.

### 1AR—Spec—Textuality

#### You should evaluate *pragmatic justifications over semantic justifications*—even if they win that their interp has a resolutional basis if they lose that it is good for debate you should vote aff.

#### No resolutional basis. I defend exactly what the topic asks. That’s most predictable.

#### Solves your plans good offense with a diversity net benefit.

**Nebel 15** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

Second, my view is not that plans are bad. On the contrary, **I think that plans are good, but only when they affirm** the resolution. Whether some plan affirms their resolution (i.e., whether it is topical) is a function of the resolution’s semantics. To repeat, I have nothing against plans in general, and I believe that **spec**ification of some resolutional parameter **may be** permissible, if not **obligatory, on many topics.** One of the great things about **LD** is that our **resolutions are diverse** not only in their subject matter but also in their structure. **This requires debaters to analyze each resolution with a fresh eye and not simply** to **import concepts** and assumptions that may have applied to old resolutions into theoretical norms for each new one. But when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is easier to continue with the same assumptions, as long as they are sufficiently shared by one’s peers on the national circuit, rather than reinventing the theoretical wheel every two months. It is important to resist this temptation and not to ignore the meaning of the resolution, even and especially if you may be more comfortable debating a different resolution.

### 1AR—Reasonability

1. Debating T every round trades off with topic education -- The precise meaning of terms like \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ isn’t important. Being quick to pull the trigger on T encourages negatives to go for it every round, meaning we have less debates about the topic.

2. Checks negative structural bias – The block has two and a half more times the speech time of the 1AR which means there’s a high probability they’ll be ahead on the T debate going into the 2NR.

3. Race to the Bottom — the best interp is always ‘the aff minus one’, competing interps means the most limiting definition is the best. That ensures bad and arbitrary debates and the aff can never win.

## ROTJ

### 1AR ROTJ—F/L theory

#### I get to weigh the <<Aff/K>> against theory—

#### Case is a disad—their theory excludes disruptive methodologies like the Aff, means that they have to win that their claims of fairness outweigh ableist violence.

#### Theory claims must be evaluated through the Role of the Judge—means that if the NC doesn’t access combatting oppression you default Aff.

#### Their claims of how to best preserve debate beg the question of whether their vision for debate is one that *deserves to be preserved*—if I win the Affirmative, you have to weigh it against their vision of debate.

#### <<Affirmative outweights—ableist violence clearly outweights xyz>>

### 1AR ROTJ—AT: fairness

#### Cross apply the Role of the Judge: utilizing fairness as a factor in decision making prioritizes self-interest over the educational value of the public sphere which coopts and destroys debate making flawed ideology replicate itself causing the violent norms. We’ve mechanized debate where we’re stuck in the same repetitious cycle.

#### The Negative’s appeal to procedural objectivity only replicates oppression.

### 1AR ROTJ—Activism

#### Best for activism— Talking about methodologies to combat oppressive structures makes us better advocates in the future—this is a key pre-requisite to education and fairness claims, even if we learn from debate, that education is useless without the ability to put it to use.

# Aff—CP

## Gen CP

### 1AR—F/L

#### Perm: Do both—no reason we can’t destabilize the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity and <<do the counterplan>>

#### And the counterplan doesn’t access the role of the judge--as a critical educator dedicated to combatting oppression, you must forefront our discourse in this round.

#### Since my AC is the only strategy for actively disrupting ableist norms in this round, default aff.

### 1AR—Process Focus Bad

#### When we make questions of process a priority, we focus on the means of policy instead of the ends. This reduces the left to counting congressional votes instead of focusing on how the poor are disenfranchised regardless of that count.

Gijs Van Oenen, senior lecturer in the department of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life,” Theory and Event, 2006 (Project Muse)

Against this 'win-win' view, I want to suggest that the increase in involvement in the political process, the sphere of policy formation, goes along with a loss of involvement in the 'product' of the process. The point here is not merely that people lack sufficient time or means to be involved in both process and result. Rather it seems that people nowadays feel more attached to the process than to its eventual product. Being actively involved in the process has acquired a sense and meaning of its own, that may compete with, or actually override, the interest in what the process aimed to realize. In other words, what the process now mainly realizes, its main 'product', is involvement with itself.

#### When political demands become valid only if they spell out the correct legislative pathways regular citizens are alienated from the process— the impact is continued disenfranchisement.

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 10- 1 1 )

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything. say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not vet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if 1 were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is,the wav we shaue 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### 1AR—PIC

### 1AR—Word PIC

#### <<S/he>> can’t access any of the case—a one line advocacy statement can’t capture the speech act of the AC.

#### Perm: Do the plan and the counterplan—they’re going to say that this is severance but the PIC alone doesn’t solve—nobody knows language is being challenged by simply avoiding it.

#### Turn: Focus on linguistic precision makes effective activism impossible.

Churchill 96 Ward, Keetoowah Cherokee, 25+ year member of the American Indian Movement and prof of Indigenous Studies at University of Colorado Boulder. From a Native Son, pg. 460

There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension. By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate and unite them. Nonetheless, such “issues” of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers or persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what they’ve said, but about how they’ve said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda, but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of a progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Mao’s principle of criticism/self-criticism – now variously called “process,” “line sharpening,” or even ‘struggle” – in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about “the issues.” All of this happens at the direct expense of actually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something “meaningful.” In the end, it reduces to a tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that it’s high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

#### Turn: Pure textualism discourages active politics and promotes Western knowledge systems by erasing the experiences of those unable or unwilling to comply.

Conquergood ’02 [The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research pp 147. Dwight Conquergood was a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University]

In even stronger terms, Raymond Williams challenged the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of “highly educated” people who are “so driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice that there are other forms of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” such as “theatre” and “active politics.” This error “resembles that of the narrow reformer who supposes that farm labourers and village craftsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that “the contempt” for performance and practical activity, “which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves” ([1958] 1983:309).Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read. According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a hallmark of Western imperialism. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulatory powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects" (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcrip- tion is not a transparent or politically innocent model for conceptualizing or engaging the world///. The root metaphor of the text underpins the supremacy of Western knowledge systems by erasing the vast realm of human knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered, "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage cannot speak at all? Or, under greater or lesser duress, opt not to do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

## JDM CP

### 1AR—JDM CP

#### First, Perm: Give adolescents medical decision making autonomy through a joint decisionmaking process—this is not mutually exclusive:

#### Their solvency advocate, Mutcherson, believes in the perm—

#### She says arguments of mutually exclusivity rely upon a faulty conflation of autonomy and independence—*none* of their evidence speaks to why you can’t make autonomous decisions while still being dependent. Any other conception of autonomy makes autonomy impossible because we are all inevitably dependent on others.

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro

The personal autonomy at issue in this context refers to "[t]he realm of inviolable sanctuary most of us sense in our own beings. '78 Personal autonomy, as manifested in the healthcare context by requiring informed consent, is widely understood to be of enormous value and benefit to individuals. As one philosopher has noted, "Whatever else we mean by autonomy ... it must be a good and admirable thing to have, not only in itself but for its fruits-responsibility, self esteem, and personal dignity. Autonomy so conceived is not merely a 'condition,' but a condition to which we aspire as an ideal."'79 While debates have raged in philosophy and law about the meaning or usefulness of autonomy, particularly when the concept is subjected to critique based on gender or age,80 for purposes of this article, I assume that autonomy is overall a good thing and that it embraces the notion that "[t]he autonomous person, as the saying goes, is 'his own man' or 'her own woman.' He/she doesn't 'belong' to anyone else, either as property or as possession. Anyone who would deal in her affairs must come to terms with her, or her agent. It will not do to negotiate only with her parents or her boss, and she has no 'keeper.'"81 This is not to say, however, that an autonomous individual is without connection, community, or allegiance. As recognized by many feminist theorists, one of the myths of autonomy is the insistence by some that dependence is the antithesis of an autonomous existence. 82 Martha Fineman explains: [A]utonomy is often presented as a state of being that is attainable by all. It is also perceived as an individually (and autonomously) developed characteristic that ulti-mately reflects the worth (or lack thereof) of the person. In this simplistic version of autonomy, the realities of... dependency are absent. In fact, the world that this vision of autonomy imagines is a world that can only be populated by adults, and then only by those adults possessing sufficient capabilities and competencies to make it possible that their only demand of government (aside from the provision of security and courts of law) be for rules that guarantee their right to be left alone to realize the gains and glory their individual talents may bring. . . [S]uch a vision is a chimera, and [ ] this version of autonomy is both undesirable and unattainable on an individual level, and therefore, destructive from a policy perspective. We all experience dependency, and we are all subsidized during our lives (although unequally and inequitably so). 83 As used in this article, autonomy does not demand a rugged or radical individualism in which people are outside of communities, but instead embraces individuals who make decisions with the support of and in conjunction with the communities, large and small, to which they belong. As philosopher Joel Feinberg elucidates: [I]f we so desire, we can minimize our commitments and thus achieve a greater amount of de facto moral independence. We may, if we wish, go through life unmarried, or forgo having children, or near neighbors. We may make as few promises as possible to others, incur no debts, join no partnerships. The picture that emerges from all of this is that of an uncommitted person, maximally independent of the demands of others. Yet it is hard to imagine such a person with the moral virtues that thrive on involvement-compassion, loyalty, cooperativeness, engagement, trust. If we think of autonomy as the name of a condition which is itself admirable, a kind of ideal condition, then the uncommitted person is subject to demerits on this score. He is clearly no paragon. 84 Few well-functioning human beings can, or would wish, to claim a completely independent existence. We live in various webs of interdependence formed by families, friendships, employment, and citizenship in various communities and countries. 85 Feinberg explains, There is a danger in discussing, in the abstract, the ideal qualities of a human being. Our very way of posing the question can lead us to forget the most significant truth about ourselves, that we are social animals. No individual person selects "autonomously" his own genetic inheritance or early upbringing. No individual person selects his country, his language, his social community and traditions. No individual invents afresh his tools, his technology, his public institutions and procedures. And yet to be a human being is to be part of a community, to speak a language, to take one's place in an already functioning group way of life. We come into awareness of ourselves as part of ongoing social processes .... 86 One could, then, accurately describe all human beings who do not live completely isolated lives as being simultaneously autonomous and dependent, with the balance between the two shifting based on changes in age, location, health status, and other factors

# Aff—DA

## Gen DA

### 1AR—Gen DA

#### The disad is exactly the sort of “fear enframing” that is coopted by capital in order to perpetuate a disablist and neoliberal society, that’s the AC Peace evidence.

#### And case outweighs—the 1AC Campbell evidence outlines how ableist normativity is the root cause of genocidal violence because it creates states of exception where we suspend ethical norms in order to reak havoc on disabled and oppresse populations. You should value these structural impacts of the disads 1% chance of actually happening—don’t allow unlikely and hyperbolic scenarios skew your decisionmaking away from helping the oppressed, especially when I have my role of the ballot claim.

#### <<Line by line>>

# Aff—K

## Gen K

### 1AR—Gen K

#### No link—<<explain how their link is absolute bullshit>>

#### Perm—destabilize the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity and <<do the alt>>-- this solves, x reason

1. **critical disability studies starts with disability but never ends with it**

**Kincaid 13**, Towards a Critical Global Disability Studies: A Case Study of the African Youth with Disabilities Network Dissertation for the degree of MSc International Development University of Bath Kelly Kincaid

As Goodley (2012) describes, **CDS ‘starts with disability but never ends with it: disability is the space from which to think through a host of political, theoretical and practical issues that are relevant to all’. CDS** have **offered challenges to universalizing frameworks**, and particularly to the social model (Goodley, 2012); these critiques have not been universally appreciated (see Oliver and Barnes, 2012). For Corker and Shakespeare, however, **addressing the ‘theoretical deficit’ of the social model is an effort to: contribute to the emancipation of people with disabilities whoever they are, and whatever they decide that emancipation means, and to the development of inclusive societies…‘thinking globally’ and ‘acting locally’** at the same time … (Corker and Shakespeare, 2002: 15) 1 Goodley (2012) further asserts **a global CDS can provide ‘a lifted-out space’ in which activism and theory are intertwined, ‘in concert with contemporary lives, the complexities of alienation and the rich hopes of resistance’** (Lash, 2011 in Goodley, 2012: 11).19 In Disability and the majority world a neo-colonial approach, Grech (2012: 52) coins and describes a Critical Global Disability Studies (CGDS) project that ‘**reflects a critical disability studies that is open, situated around prioritising, engaging with and learning about the Global South in its full complexity’. This project engages with bodies positioned at the ‘anxious intersection’ of the global and the local** (ibid: 54), **examining disability across cultures, circumstances and contexts, in which the meaning of disability is constantly changing.** The CGDS project moves disability beyond oppression, calling for an exploration of family relations. The body in disability is accentuated. CGDS is ‘grounded in and conversant with local contexts, socio-economics, micro-politics, cultures, issues of poverty and global dimensions of power’ (Grech, 2011: 98).

1. **Coalitional politics are necessary in this instance to rupture medicalization – it facilitates holistic understandings**

**Ben-Moshe 11** (Liat, “Disabling Incarceration: Connecting Disability to Divergent Confinements in the USA” Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 –403Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 –403,

However, **this process also allows for the creation of powerful new coalitions that have the potential to implode or resist these categorizations** from within. **All these counter-hegemonic discourses resist the impetus of normalization** (Davis, 2002), **medicalization and the authority of medical ‘experts’** (Foucault, 1965; Zola, 1991) and especially labeling for diagnostic and pre-scriptive use on the bodies and minds of disabled people. **They resist the trumping of narratives of cure, and insist on access, social justice** and rights instead (or in some formulations- in addition).Most importantly, **these discourses and scholarly fields break the dichotomy between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ and leave bio-diversity as a continuum of ways of living in the world, and nota binary with hierarchies attached**. I thus argue that **disability studies could benefit immensely by actively taking up the theoriza-tions and lived experiences in the field of developmental disability and mad studies. In relation to the sociological study of incarceration, what such expansive formulations achieve is an understanding of incarceration in its broadest sense in relation to hospitalization, institutionaliza-tion and imprisonment and a fuller understanding of the forces that construct medicalization and criminalization.**

#### And even if they win on the perm, case outweighs the K—the concepts of normality and abberance underlying the normative invulnerable body of disablist society are at the core of the <<critiques impacts>> -- Campbell says that it is this “state of exception” that replicates oppression—just as we view disabled people as “abberant”, so too do we view <<xyz>> as abberant.

## Age K

### 1AR—Harrison Age K

#### No link— I don’t socially construct age based on biology, which is what Macleod assumes. Instead, I break down biological determinism which means that the Aff solves.

#### Perm—destabilize the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity and reject age based characterizations.

#### Body focus is uniquely key—it adds a new layer of analysis that lets us intersectionally combine crip resistance and fighting ageism.

1. **Coalitional politics are necessary in this instance to rupture medicalization – it facilitates holistic understandings—this slays the K**

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## Race K

### 1AR—Race K

#### No link—<<explain how their link is wrong>>

#### Perm—destabilize the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity and <<do the alt>>-- this solves, x reason

1. **Body focus is uniquely key—it adds a new layer of analysis that lets us intersectionally combine crip resistance and <<the neg K>>-- prefer this conceptual framing issue. —that’s Knoll**

#### AC Mingus evidence is clear that disability and whiteness are mutually interdependent—we must have a coalitional struggle in order to address the worst manifestations of both oppressions.

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#### And even if they win on the perm, case outweighs the K—the concepts of normality and abberance underlying the normative invulnerable body of disablist society are at the core of the <<white supremacy >> -- Campbell says that it is this “state of exception” that replicates oppression—just as we view disabled people as “abberant”, so too do we view <<people of color >> as abberant.

#### Ableism naturalizes and amplifies racism – black kids are legally segregated through special education based on ableist logics

Beratan 6, Gregg works at the University Of London Institute Of Education, Institutionalizing Inequity:

Ableism, Racism and IDEA 2004, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/682/859

\*\*\*IDEA=Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The conflation of institutional ableism and institutional racism serves to make both stronger than either would be on their own. Society's willingness to accept discrimination against disabled people as the result of individual deficiencies is used to make racism more palatable. As Reid and Knight (in press) point out:

To explain overrepresentation of minority students in special education, we first reveal U.S. historical conditions that have made institutionalized racism, classism, and sexism seem natural and just through their conflation with disability, a form of oppression based on ableism.

While much of the focus on institutional racism in education has been around the resegregation of public schools through a variety of covert mechanisms, including white flight (Johnson & Shapiro, 2003), testing (Brown et al., 2003; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000), "color-blind" policies (Bonilla-Silva, 2003), and pedagogy (Gillborn, 1990; Sleeter, 2004), the use of ableist segregation of special education allows for a legal, overt, and systematized means of achieving the same end. IDEA does, legally and overtly, everything that the courts attempted to do away with in the Brown decision.

The 2004 incarnation of IDEA expands upon the attempts of earlier versions to address disproportionality. Whereas the 1997 version of IDEA stopped at requiring local education agencies (LEAs) to report, review, and, if necessary, revise policies, practices, and procedures aimed at preventing the disproportionate representation of minority students in special education, the 2004 version of IDEA mandates LEAs

to reserve the maximum amount of funds under section 613(f) to provide comprehensive coordinated early intervening services to serve children in the local educational agency, particularly children in those groups that were significantly overidentified under paragraph (1) (P.L.108-446; p. 94).

This full funding trigger located in section 618 d (B) of IDEA is written in a way to suggest that it is intended to give more funds to LEAs for the purpose of fighting existing disproportionality. Although there is no reason to question this intention, an understanding of both institutional ableism and racism means that intentions are irrelevant and there is a need to focus on outcomes. While it is too soon to determine the outcomes of this clause, there is enough evidence to speculate upon possibilities.

Anything that triggers maximum funding for a school or local education agency is an incentive. In this case, rather than discouraging the disproportionate identification of minority students as disabled, the clause serves as a bounty actively encouraging overidentification as a means to higher funding levels. Greene and Forster (2002) found that bounty funding systems in special education led to far greater growth in special education than lump sum funding systems (no incentives):

The average special education enrollment rate for states that had lump-sum systems at any time during the study period grew from 11.1% in the 1991—92 school year to 12.4% in the 2000—01 school year, an increase of 1.3 percentage points. In the same period, the average special education enrollment rate for states that maintained bounty systems for the entire study period grew from 10.5% to 12.8%, an increase of 2.3 percentage points"

(p. 7).

Although Greene and Forster (2002) focused upon the effects of bounty systems on the identification of special education students, there is no reason to suggest that a bounty targeting minority students would have a different outcome.

It could be argued that any incentive would be nullified by additional costs related to a student being identified as needing special education services. Greene and Forster (2002) have also answered this claim by pointing out that there is actually a cost benefit tied to increased identification of students.

Some services that a school would have provided to a particular child no matter what can be redefined as special education services if the child is placed in special education; these services are not truly special education costs because they would have been provided anyway. For example, if a school provides extra reading help to students who are falling behind in reading, the school must bear that cost itself. But if the same school redefines those students as learning disabled rather than slow readers, state and federal government will help pick up the tab for those services. This is financially advantageous for the school because it brings in new state and federal funding to cover "costs" that the school would have had to pay for anyway. Furthermore, there are many fixed costs associated with special education that do not increase with every new child. For example, if a school hires a full-time special education reading teacher, it will pay the same cost whether that teacher handles three students a day or ten. However, the school will collect a lot more money for teaching ten special education students than it would for teaching three (p. 4).

The funding mechanisms in terms of both funding received and cost benefits becomes an institutionalized mechanism of inequity.

Is this a form of institutional ableism or institutional racism? It is neither and it is both. In this instance, the two are indistinguishable. Neither offers sufficient explanation on its own. Crenshaw (2003) argues in her analysis of the intersections of race and sex that focusing on either construction as discrete from the other:

"...creates a distorted analysis and sexism because the operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more complex phenomenon" (Crenshaw, 2003; p. 23).

Disability and race are similarly conjoined in IDEA's disproportionality clause. It is ableist in that students' opportunities and experiences are being limited by mechanisms and structures built around constructions of disability, but it is also institutionally racist in the way it targets students by their membership in racial and ethnic minority groups. The racist outcomes could not be achieved without the ableist mechanisms.

#### Yes, it is much worse for people living in the intersections of disability and race but that’s why the 1AC’s coalition politics are so important because only in that frame can this be addressed---the newest empirical studies prove

Campbell 8, Fiona Kumari is a Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, <http://hivdatf.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/31134351.pdf>

Recent research correlates the experience of racism to low socio-economic status and acquisition of physical and psychological impairment (Williams and Collins 1995). The subjectifying experiences of racism as racism not only cause distress but impact on mental health

status (Kreiger 1999). Pyke and Dang argued that because internalized racism is an adaptive response to racism, compliance and resistance which in their own ways reproduce or replicate

racism are interrelated processes (Pyke and Dang 2003, 151). One of the approaches of CRT is

storytelling – counter storytelling in combination with the ‘historical triangulation of facts that

have an impact on present-day discrimination’ (Parker and Stovall 2004). The silence of

disabled people has been inverted with the emergence of a disability rights movement and the development of critical disability studies. Speaking otherwise about the lived body with impairment needs to extend to spaces exploring the personal costs of living under ableism beyond the dominant genre of biography into theory. In this respect a study of ableism, especially internalized ableism, moves outside the narrow confines of an individualized phenomenology and Disability & Society 155

squarely locates the analysis within a collectivist history of ideas and the field of discursive

practices.

**Their critique alone is like exploring a meadow with only a biologist’s perspective – the perm brings in the diverse perspectives of the poet, farmer, philosopher, etc. – our multi-dimensional criticism is essential to deconstruct whiteness and ableism**

**Smith 4**, Executive Director, Vermont Developmental Disabilities Council, Phil, Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668

**This analysis seems critical in understanding the relationship of whiteness studies and disability studies.** The normative disciplinary power of whiteness undergirding the rationality of Eurocentric culture and thought segregates not only those defined as not-white from the terrains of equality, equity, and justice, but also those defined as not-Able (body or mind). A project of inclusion that reinvents whiteness by calculating freshly an ideology of diverse reasons, intelligences, and experiences will, of necessity, involve an exploration of the cartography of abled Normality. **A broad whiteness studies approach must shake hands with a broad disability studies approach if either whiteness or ability is to be reconceptualized. I propose an intellectual alliance between whiteness** studies **and disability studies** in order **to accentuate the underlying invisibility of normative whiteness and able-ness ideologies. These structures are at the core of Western culture, and yet remain unnoticed, un-observed. Without turning our cultural gaze on them – without scrutinizing and inspecting** **their borders – these ideologies will continue to oppress and obfuscate, exclude and excise**, human **communities** that have been **placed not just outside the margins, but off the page.** In calling for this kind of intellectual alliance, I do not want to place it in opposition to a creative, articulate, cross-disciplinary collaboration between race studies and disability studies. Besides creating a problematic and difficult binary, I want to acknowledge the importance of the work of anti-racist scholars like Derrick Bell (1987), W.E.B. DuBois (1971), Frantz Fanon (1968), bell hooks (1994), Toni Morrison (1992), and Cornel West (1999) in creating the possibility for and development of a robust whiteness studies. Race studies has functioned in the same way that disability studies has in creating the development of normal theories, as a kind of essential breeding ground for ideas and thought. The work of those within the Black American civil rights movement has done much to make it possible for people with disabilities to end their own segregation and discrimination (Robinson 2002). And the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa enabled some disability activists to begin thinking and arguing about the oppression of people with disabilities (Campbell & Oliver 1996). What implications does this intersection have for both whiteness studies and disability studies? **It will be essential for both scholarly fields to see themselves as inherently interdisciplinary**. I use the term field, and think of the meadow out behind my old Vermont farmhouse, filled with an amazing diversity of plant, animal, and, as I walk through it on a late summer evening to swim naked in the dark at the pond by its edge, even spiritual, life. **To explore that meadow, to understand it in totally new and increasingly holistic ways, I need to be not just a biologist, zoologist, or botanist, but a poet, a farmer, a philosopher, a sociologist. So, too, will those seeking to explore the meadows of whiteness and disability need to stretch far beyond what has traditionally been thought of as the processes of exploration used to outline cultural processes – they will need to use a synergistic tool belt** worn by an overtly Renaissance craftsperson. What does it mean for whiteness to recognize disability within its own ranks? An exploration of the way ableism fits in with all the other "isms" will be an important expansion of the work of whiteness studies scholarship. Too often left out of such cultural exploration, an understanding of the impact of disability on whiteness in Western culture will be an area worth exploring. For example, what is the intersection of whiteness and disability in novels like Moby Dick, The Color Purple, or Heart of Darkness, in films like Taxi Driver, or in works by photographers such as Diane Arbus? And what role does race play in the context of the disability rights movement? We know something of how the history of disability rights activism owes something to the civil rights movements of Blacks in this and other countries, but we know only relatively little about how whiteness and racism is played out in concrete terms on the bodies of people with disabilities as they struggle to move from the margins to the center. To borrow again from Kincheloe, "**understanding that identities are always in the process of negotiation, critical pedagogy of whiteness does not seek to produce closure on the new white identities it engages**" (1999, Paragraph 58). **So, too, must an activist pedagogy of normality resist finality, and rather assert that it is always coming to grow toward new abled identity. Whiteness studies, normal theories, and disability studies must continue to stretch their boundaries, to look in new ways, with new tools, at the stories we tell ourselves about the way we live our lives.**

## Cap K

### 1AR—Cap K

#### No link—<<explain how their link is wrong>>

#### Perm—destabilize the normative invulnerable body of disablist modernity and <<do the alt>>-- this solves

#### The Affirmative is a microcosm of resistance against capitalism—1AC Peace evidence talks about how the medical industrial complex is a neoliberal industry driven by an insatiable desire for profit, challenging it is part of a broader grassroots movement against cap.

1. **Body focus is uniquely key—it adds a new layer of analysis that lets us intersectionally combine crip resistance and <<the neg K>>-- prefer this conceptual framing issue. —that’s Knoll**

#### Disability rights are key to challenge capitalism

Russell 02 [(Russell\* and Malhotra\*\* 2 - \* writes on the political, social and economic aspects of disablement her socio-economic analysis has been published in the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, the Review of Radical Political Economy, the Journal of Disability Policy Studies, Disability & Society, Monthly Review, Disability Studies Quarterly, Left Business Observer, Real World Micro, 9th edition, Socialist Register 2002, and the Backlash Against the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reinterpreting Disability Rights (Corporealities, Discourses of Disability) University of Michigan Press, 2003.\*\* is a Canadian disability rights activist and a member of the New Democratic Party. He will be commencing graduate legal studies at Harvard Law School. ( Marta and Ravi 2002 “ CAPITALISM AND DISABILITY]

While new social movements fighting against racism, patriarchy and homophobia were gaining prominence in many Western countries in the 1960s,45 movements of disabled people, with more or less coherent programmes and ideologies, also slowly emerged. Unlike other social movements, the various disability rights movements46 to date have received relatively little attention from socialists, union activists or academics, even in the USA, which arguably has one of the strongest and oldest disability rights movements.47 Yet an examination of their various trajectories suggests useful insights that those seeking to challenge capitalism in other struggles can learn from and incorporate in them. To the extent that widespread accommodation to the needs of disabled workers would necessarily transform the workplace and challenge expectations of ever increasing productivity rates, the disability rights movement can be seen as radically democratic and counter-hegemonic in potential and scope.

1. **critical disability studies starts with disability but never ends with it**

**Kincaid 13**, Towards a Critical Global Disability Studies: A Case Study of the African Youth with Disabilities Network Dissertation for the degree of MSc International Development University of Bath Kelly Kincaid

As Goodley (2012) describes, **CDS ‘starts with disability but never ends with it: disability is the space from which to think through a host of political, theoretical and practical issues that are relevant to all’. CDS** have **offered challenges to universalizing frameworks**, and particularly to the social model (Goodley, 2012); these critiques have not been universally appreciated (see Oliver and Barnes, 2012). For Corker and Shakespeare, however, **addressing the ‘theoretical deficit’ of the social model is an effort to: contribute to the emancipation of people with disabilities whoever they are, and whatever they decide that emancipation means, and to the development of inclusive societies…‘thinking globally’ and ‘acting locally’** at the same time … (Corker and Shakespeare, 2002: 15) 1 Goodley (2012) further asserts **a global CDS can provide ‘a lifted-out space’ in which activism and theory are intertwined, ‘in concert with contemporary lives, the complexities of alienation and the rich hopes of resistance’** (Lash, 2011 in Goodley, 2012: 11).19 In Disability and the majority world a neo-colonial approach, Grech (2012: 52) coins and describes a Critical Global Disability Studies (CGDS) project that ‘**reflects a critical disability studies that is open, situated around prioritising, engaging with and learning about the Global South in its full complexity’. This project engages with bodies positioned at the ‘anxious intersection’ of the global and the local** (ibid: 54), **examining disability across cultures, circumstances and contexts, in which the meaning of disability is constantly changing.** The CGDS project moves disability beyond oppression, calling for an exploration of family relations. The body in disability is accentuated. CGDS is ‘grounded in and conversant with local contexts, socio-economics, micro-politics, cultures, issues of poverty and global dimensions of power’ (Grech, 2011: 98)

#### And even if they win on the perm, case outweighs the K—the concepts of normality and abberance underlying the normative invulnerable body of disablist society are at the core of the <<critiques impacts>> -- Campbell says that it is this “state of exception” that replicates oppression—just as we view disabled people as “abberant”, so too do we view <<xyz>> as abberant.

#### Case is a DA to the alt; class movements can’t solve ableism

Kitchin 10, Director of the National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis, served on a number of government boards and consultative panels, doctorate from the University of Wales, Lecturer in the School of Geosciences at Queen's University of Belfastand the Department of Geography at the National University of Ireland, (Rob, 7/1/10, “ Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people”)

It is increasingly clear that the relationships between disability and society cannot be framed within either strict economic and political terms or purely socio-cultural processes, but must encompass a mixture of the two. In a mixed approach, disabled people are excluded not only because of capitalist mode of production, but also because of socially constructed modes of thought and expression enshrined in cultural representations and cultural myths. The neo-Marxist might claim that such representations and myths are a particular manifestation or expression of capital. Such claims can be rejected: all behaviour and action are not predicated upon capital concerns. For example, exclusionary processes within Northern Ireland between Nationalist and Unionists are predominantly predicated upon territory and power, not capital. Whilst it could be argued that the sociospatial nexus in Northern Ireland was a result of feudal capital relations, the current con¯ ict has shifted in emphasis. Class, whilst important, is only one axis of oppression within society with disability, gender, race, sexuality, religious beliefs and nationality providing the context in which other power relations operate: there are multiple, interacting ®elds of power (Pile, 1997). Processes of oppression can arise out of the social mobilisation of groups of individuals with con¯ icting interests. The focus of attention should therefore shift from capital and class to power in its various manifestations.

## TYang

### 1AR—Tuck and Roll

#### Perm: Do both

#### Solves with a participation disad—this card wrecks the K <<or>>

#### No link—This critique operates on a fundamental mischaracterization of our affirmative. The judge’s ballot is not an exchange for suffering presented in the 1AC, it’s an affirmation of our methodology as a realistic praxis in order to affect concrete change. We outline clear problems that we seek to. The stories that we tell are not of intense suffering, but of problematic actions that we offer a concrete method for addressing.

Rebecca Wanzo 9, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, 228-232

Despite my disappointment in these ﬁlms and frequent annoyance with the narrative trajectory of many of their productions, I admit that I have a bit of a soft spot for the Lifetime network. I, too, used to automatically criticize made-for-television movies “inspired by a true story” about women at risk. I found them exploitative, as any ﬁlm can be that makes entertainment out of a personal tragedy. Lifetime Television has been called “television for victims,” in a criticism of its seemingly endless capacity to show ﬁ lms about the victimization of women.5 One of the questions that this moniker raises is what kind of storylines about people have the most dramatic impact. Popular ﬁ lms with high dramatic impact depict violence, stories of surviv- ing some atypical traumatic event, or struggling with some more powerful person or entity. One aspect of the criticisms of Lifetime is the objection to formulaic melodrama in itself, framed within the gendered derision of women’s victimization narratives or, on the other side of the political spectrum, discomfort with such narratives as demeaning, reductive, and trite. The ﬁ lms shown on the network, some produced by Lifetime but most produced elsewhere, vary in quality, but the criticisms of Lifetime raise a question that I have explored throughout this book: What is the best way to represent a story of suffering? ¶ 229¶ Simply crying at a Lifetime ﬁlm clearly cannot sustain any sub- stantive political work—but what if the crying citizen is directed to, at the very least, awareness, and in the best case scenario, action, after their emotional catharsis? Sorrow produced at the sight of a dead or wounded woman may not accomplish anything unless the representation is framed in relationship to some political action, but tears in relation to abolition and child abduction did produce action. However, a major ethical problem with using sympathy and compassion as the primary mechanism for political change is that sentimental politics depends on the cultural feelings of those in power, and the disempowered must depend on patronage. Hannah Arendt argues that compassion cannot embrace a larger population, but pity can, and pity is a dangerous affect because it cannot exist without misfortune, thus “it has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak . . . by being a virtue of sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost automatically lead to a gloriﬁ cation of its cause, which is the suffering of others.”6 ¶ Following Arendt, the charge against Lifetime could be that it thus encourages sadism because watchers could take pleasure in pity. Or, as literary critic Marianne Noble has suggested in her study of sentimentality, the network might embrace masochism because watchers would identify with the sufferer and might begin to take pleasure in these fantasies of subjection.7 However, these readings of the pleasures of consuming stories of subjection are too narrow. In the case of Lifetime, casting these ﬁlms as only narratives of victimization is too limited a reading. After watching several ﬁ lms, I began to be compelled by stories I had not heard before about women interven- ing when the state fails to protect them. The stories were clearly not only about victimization, but also about survival. The movies negotiate a balance between structural critique and stories of individual heroism, and I am often disappointed, as with the ﬁ lms discussed above, with how much weight is placed on the side of individual transformation. Nonetheless I later began defending the network out of political principle, as part of a broader effort to challenge the ¶ 230¶ facile denunciation of the word “victim.” Lifetime’s ﬁ lms are often poor in terms of artistic merit, but the network is contributing to a national conversation about what agency can look like. ¶ My argument may seem as if I am looking for politics in all the wrong places, relying on sentimentality when I should focus on politically rational arguments that eschew the appeals of emotional response. I am not asking for radical progressivism from popular culture. Instead, I am arguing that politics is often accomplished through the popular and conventional work of emotional appeals, as many activists throughout history have demonstrated. The question facing activists for African American women—or, for that matter, advocates for any identity group outside the national imaginary of ideal citizenship—is not only how to expose discrimination, but also how to make use of existing rhetoric so that attacks on their bodies can be read as pressing concerns for all U.S. citizens. Affect and popular culture can be easily criticized as tools of anti-intellectual conservative machines. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno rightly argue, popular culture focuses on producing narratives of comfort or affects that can ultimately serve the state’s purposes.8 Totally escaping the political storytelling of the status quo elicited by mass-produced texts is indeed impossible. However, the impossibility of total escape does not preclude the possibility of making use of tools produced by ideology. Mobilizing affect demands use of proven rhetorical tools, but this use need not forestall a criticism of the need to employ the structures in the ﬁrst place. Negotiating the relationship between challenging the “master’s tools” and making use of them to garner ﬁnancial support and political power is not an easy project, but it is a necessary one. ¶ The book’s title is inspired by this very tension between see- ing popular cultural productions as inevitably politically inefﬁ cacious and recognizing the possibilities offered by making use of widely circulated genres and media. When Gil Scott-Heron produced his famous choreo-poem, “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised,” in 1974, he called attention to the disconnect between radical action and violent struggles taking place in the streets and the pleasures of oblivion offered by scripted television and commercials.9 Television stood in for mass-produced media that would not show what was really occurring in the streets, like “pigs shooting down brothers in instant replay.” Scott-Heron pointed to the need for his audience to take to the streets and participate, live, in the revolution. Indeed, a ¶ 231¶ rue revolution requires “live” political action and organizing, and television and many cultural productions neglect a multitude of issues that are politically urgent. However, it is clearly no longer the case that “pigs shooting down brothers in the street is left off of instant replay.” Important events are depicted on the news, in scripted tele- vision shows, in genre ﬁ ction, in magazines, in movies, and on the Internet. You can even catch the occasional social message in a television commercial. Rather than reject various media wholesale, we are left with a set of questions about what to do with contemporary media realities. How and why are certain kinds of traditionally neglected issues represented? Once represented, how are they interpreted, and can activists play a role in that interpretation? What do activists do about the complexities lost when they make use of certain kinds of mass-marketed discourses? ¶ Octavia Butler perhaps best articulated this problem in her science-ﬁ ction novel Parable of the Talents. The novel exempliﬁ es what Lauren Berlant calls the postsentimental text—one that exhibits longing for the unconﬂ icted intimacy and political promise senti- mentality offers but is skeptical of the ultimate political efﬁ cacy of making feeling central to political change. Her heroine, Olamina, suffers from “hyperempathy” syndrome, which allows her to feel the emotions of others, but Butler is careful to argue that being able to feel the pain of others is not the means for liberation—it is a “delusional disorder.” Thus Olamina focuses on other modes of political change, and struggles to gain followers for her politi- cal and spiritual project for survival, Earthseed, in a United States devastated by environmental destruction and the domination of a repressive fusion of government and a religious right organiza- tion called Christian America. Through Olamina’s struggle, Butler addresses the intellectual discomfort with consumption by having a character explicitly argue that only strategic commodiﬁ cation will result in successful dissemination of radical ideas. Olamina struggles with the means by which she can circulate Earthseed, until someone suggests to her that she must use the marketing tools she slightly disparages to compel people to her project. Her companion, Len, argues that Olamina must “focus on what people want and tell them how your system will help them get it.” She resists the call to “preach” the way her Christian American enemy Jarret does, rejecting “preaching,” “telling folksy stories,” emphasizing a proﬁ t motive, and self-consciously using her charismatic persona to sell Earthseed. ¶ 232¶ Len argues that her resistance to using the tools of commodiﬁ cation “leaves the ﬁ eld to people who are demagogues—to the Jarrets of the world.”10 Butler ultimately presents the moral that the project of producing populist texts for mass consumption cannot be left to those with unproductive or dangerous dreams, abandoned by a Left that desires not only revolution but also political change resulting in real material gains.¶ Clearly, the productions of mass-culture are not the only way to move people to action, but they are no doubt a tool. The dismissiveness accompanying the label of the sentimental in contemporary culture is because academic critics claim that it does not do anything, it is the antithesis of action. However, this book is about how sentimentality is doing things all the time. For better or worse, it teaches people to identify “proper” objects of sympathy. It teaches people how to relate to each other. It teaches people how to make compelling arguments about their pain. The circulation of sentimental political storytelling often depends on media to which many progressives have a schizophrenic relationship. News media and television are often tools of the state, but citizens depend on the news for the free circulation of information and often look for progressive politics in television shows. Others disavow the “idiot box” altogether and have faith only in alternative news sources. However, the dichotomy between the popular and other spaces in which people tell stories about suffering is a false one. Sentimental political storytelling is omnipresent in U.S. culture. While the discourse has many short-comings, people interested in political change are taking a perilous road if they ignore the possibilities of imperfect stories told about citizens in pain.

#### Exclusion disad—Disabled people are already barred from participation in the medical-industrial complex—that’s Peace. Their alt is complicity with subjugation—telling marginalized groups to deal with it themselves instead of taking action. Means aff is a disad.

#### 

#### And we’ll turn their impact- Tuck and Yang rely on the idea that a focus on the spectacle trades off with an analysis of structure, but that begs the question of whether a focus on structure is the best way to confront oppression. In fact, a sole focus on structure ignores personal complicity which only replicates oppression.

Moore 11 (Darnell L. Moore, a writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy, “On Location: The ‘I’ in the Intersection”, December 12, 2011)//Miro

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual genealogy from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self.

# Aff—NC

## Gen NC

### 1AR—NC Gen.

#### AC slays their ethical theory—

#### The normative moral agent that underpins their ethical theory is fundamentally one rooted in our ableist society. Our society violently lashes out at disabled people on the margins because they are perceived as threats to the ideal of the normative, invulnerable body—that’s Hughes.

#### Cross apply the role of the ballot – power relations need to be analyzed as a prerequisite to ethics because that’s the only way to produce effective education, means your ethics are complicit in ableism—that’s Giroux.

#### Only by first challenging the concept of the “real self” underlying their moral theory can we engage in anti-ableist ethics, otherwise the NC replicates the structures of oppression the aff criticizes.

1. Jake Nebel (TOC 2009 semifinalist, Marshall Scholar at Oxford). “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics.” vBriefly. February 20th, 2015. http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/ [↑](#footnote-ref-1)